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Abstract:
There is now broad agreement that ideas like person-centred care, patient expertise and 
shared decision-making are no longer peripheral to health discourse, fine ideals or merely 
desirable additions to sound, scientific clinical practice.  Rather, their incorporation into our 
thinking and planning of health and social care is essential if we are to respond adequately to 
the problems that confront us: they need to be seen not as “ethical add-ons” but core 
components of any genuinely integrated, realistic and conceptually sound account of 
healthcare practice.
This, the tenth philosophy thematic edition of the journal, presents papers conducting urgent 
research into the social context of scientific knowledge and the significance of viewing clinical 
knowledge not as something that “sits within the minds” of researchers and practitioners, but 
as a relational concept, the product of social interactions.  It includes papers on the nature of 
reasoning and evidence, the on-going problems of how to 'integrate' different forms of 
scientific knowledge with broader, humanistic understandings of reasoning and judgement, 
patient and community perspectives. Discussions of the epistemological contribution of 
patient perspectives to the nature of care, and the crucial and still under-developed role of 
phenomenology in medical epistemology, are followed by a broad range of papers focussing 
on shared decision-making, analysing its proper meaning, its role in policy, methods for 
realising it and its limitations in real-world contexts.
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Interactions between persons – knowledge, decision-making and the co-production of 
practice1
There is now broad agreement that ideas like person-centred care, patient expertise and 
shared decision-making are no longer peripheral to health discourse, fine ideals or merely 
desirable additions to sound, scientific clinical practice.[1-7]  Rather, their incorporation into 
our thinking and planning of health and social care is essential if we are to respond 
adequately to the problems that confront us: they need to be seen not as “ethical add-ons” but 
core components of any genuinely integrated, realistic and conceptually sound account of 
healthcare practice.[8-13]
As reported in the most recent philosophy thematic edition of this journal,[14] researchers are 
rising to this challenge, to develop accounts of these key ideas with substantive import and 
application.  To do so effectively requires not only extensive empirical work to understand and 
adequately characterise perspectives previously ignored or marginalised,[15-23] but also a 
fundamental conceptual shift in our understanding of the nature of and relationships between 
knowledge, evidence, value, patient experience and the social context of care, as well as the 
social context of research and all forms of knowledge production. [24,25]  Put in economic 
terms, this shift requires a movement away from construing care as something provided to 
patients by professionals, and towards a model of partnership or co-production[26-28]: “the 
design, delivery and evaluation of services in an equal and reciprocal relationship between 
professionals, people using services, their families and their neighbours”.[29]
The project to transform these core ideas from “rhetorical aspirations” to established practice 
will require the collaboration not only of theorists and empirical researchers, but also of 
practitioners, patients, family carers and representatives of the broader communities affected. 
[30-35]  The dialogues we need to have are beginning, but they are by no means complete.  
As some of the contributions to this edition make clear, there are unresolved questions, 
generating on-going debate, about how best to make meaningful dialogue possible, who 
needs to be included and who should not be included, as well as about how to respond to the 
limits upon these developments placed by broader social, economic and political norms.
The clinician Stephen Henry noted in the first philosophy thematic edition of this journal that:
“Clinical medicine involves interacting with and understanding persons, and thus addresses a 
problem that is fundamentally different from and conceptually more complex than the kind of 
reasoning involved in problems such as mathematical calculation or measuring the masses of 
chemical isotopes.”[36]  
This, the tenth philosophy thematic edition of the journal, presents papers conducting urgent 
research into the social context of scientific knowledge and the significance of viewing clinical 
knowledge not as something that “sits within the minds and bodies”[37] of researchers and 
practitioners, but as a relational concept, the product of social interactions.  It includes papers 
on the nature of reasoning and evidence, the on-going problems of how to 'integrate' different 
forms of scientific knowledge with each other as well as with broader, humanistic 
understandings of reasoning and judgement, patient and community perspectives.[37-48]  
Discussions of the epistemological contribution of patient perspectives to the nature of care, 
and the crucial and still under-developed role of phenomenology in medical epistemology,[49-
51] are followed by a broad range of papers focussing on shared decision-making, analysing 
its proper meaning, its role in policy, methods for realising it and its limitations in real-world 
contexts.[52-77]
Knowledge, communication and informality: judgement and evidence in context
It seems almost too banal (perhaps even tautological) to point out that all practice, all 
research, all knowledge and indeed any human activity, takes place within a social context.  
As Wittgenstein noted,[78] even the private speculations I share with no-one are only possible 
because I have learned a public language.  Yet, as debates about the nature of medical 
reasoning, evidence-based healthcare and clinical ethics have demonstrated, we are inclined 
1 With thanks to Nicola Blunden and Gideon Calder for bringing the concept of co-production to the 
editor's attention.
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to adopt too abstract a view of knowledge and reasoning, to focus on formality and precision 
and ignore the importance of interaction, the context of communication, interpretation and the 
informal negotiation of meaning.
The edition opens with a paper by Dominic Hurst and Trisha Greenhalgh, which begins by 
noting that literature aimed at improving health practices tends to focus on propositional 
knowledge, adopting a model of decision-making in which “knowledge sits within the minds 
and bodies of healthcare workers”.[37]  They contrast this model to practice theories that “de-
centre knowledge from human actors, instead situating knowing in the interactions between 
all human and non-human actors".  Analysing extensive evidence of video recordings in two 
dental practices, they develop and defend an account of knowing in clinical practice as “a 
collective bricolage – using the actors’ respective embodied knowing to generate and solve 
problems together”.  The “ecological” account of practice they defend has implications for the 
most effective ways to improve practices, challenging traditional models of decision-making in 
which “the professional is often the only one conceived as bringing (a usually “scientific”) 
knowledge to an encounter”.
Their paper is followed by a timely reminder of the social context of systematic research and 
review.  Morten Sagar and Isabella Pistone begin by noting that the evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) movement has generated a rapid growth in reviews of research literature, with 
systematic reviews becoming more common in a wide range of professions, including 
education, public health, and social work.[38]  The systematic methodology of the review can 
conceal the “interplay of informalities” underlying the research, generated by complexities and 
controversies regarding disciplinary methods, stakeholder values and other processes “not 
detailed in the formal descriptions of methods or reporting of reviews”.  The authors illustrate 
their point with a thorough analysis of a scoping review conducted by the Public Health 
Agency of Sweden on suicide prevention interventions.  While it may be tempting to see 
literature reviews as formal, step-by-step procedures for surveying the available evidence, 
this obscures the informal negotiations and unpredictability of any complex review.
Sasha Lawson-Frost revisits the long-standing problem of “integrating” scientific evidence, as 
understood by the EBM movement, with patient values, clinical judgement and expertise, 
noting that “a significant amount of the literature on EBM” still “takes this integration to be 
unproblematic”.[39]  In line with our previous authors, Lawson-Frost notes that this issue is 
epistemic in nature, being “essentially the problem of how we can use information which is 
both general, (eg about a population sample), and descriptive, (eg about what expected 
outcomes are), to reach clinical judgements which are individualised (applying to a particular 
patient), and normative (about what is best for their health).”  The author argues that the 
problem needs to be urgently addressed via “a more developed account of how clinicians can 
make inferences about what is best for their patients, based on the different kinds of 
information they have about evidence, values, and patient symptoms and histories.”
As Ray Pawson observes, the lack of correspondence between tests of treatments and their 
application in real-world contexts is something “clinical research methodology has wrestled 
with” for over fifty years.[40] His paper discusses a proposed solution to this problem, “the 
pragmatic trial” - the proposal to conduct clinical trials in conditions corresponding more 
closely to everyday practice.  The author states that this solution “has proved easier to utter 
than to execute”, because the concept of the pragmatic trial is “essentially contested... there 
is widespread agreement on an idea but not on the best realisation”.  The paper concludes 
that, while there is clearly extensive support for the “pragmatic turn” in clinical research, there 
is profound disagreement on where that pathway will lead, and the precise role of shared 
decision-making and patient engagement in shaping practice is far from being determined.
The paper by Jon Williamson reminds us that even the integration of different conceptions of 
scientific methodology in clinical research is very far from being an issue resolved.  
Williamson praises the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) for its use of a 
broader evidence base than is typically found elsewhere in biomedicine.[41]  He identifies two 
evidential principles in the evaluation of carcinogenicity by the IARC: Evidential Proximity and 
Independence.  Evidential Proximity is the principle that population-level studies on 
carcinogenicity carry more weight when they are closer to the population of interest; the 
principle of Independence notes that the carcinogenicity of each agent must be assessed 
independently of other agents.  Williamson argues that these principles can lead to 
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inconsistencies and recommends a reformulation of both principles that more robustly 
considers mechanistic evidence.
Returning to the context of medical practice, Donald Stanley and Scott Sehon discuss 
medical reasoning and doctor-patient communication.[42] Taking as their starting point the 
need for clinicians to learn how to talk to patients “at all levels of education, from different 
cultures, patients bringing their own views on language use and comprehension”, they argue 
that the pragmatist philosophy of Charles Pierce can be applied to help clinicians become 
more self-consciously aware, both of their own activities in diagnosing medical conditions and 
of the potential pitfalls of communication with patients.  They illustrate their claims via a series 
of scenarios, showing how causal explanations and theory building are at work even in very 
simple verbal exchanges.
Berkeley Franz and John Murphy comment on the unmet need to account for the role of 
philosophy, beyond medical ethics, in planning, implementing and evaluating the delivery of 
health services based in, and responsive to, communities.[43]  Such responsiveness requires 
attending to local knowledge and interpretations informed by the values and interests of 
community members.  As persons at the centre of health care, these members are moral 
agents who need to be empowered to participate in guiding and controlling health care 
interventions in communities as intersubjectively constructed “life worlds”.  This need aligns 
with a philosophical shift away from the medical model of health care toward a 
biopsychosocial one that privileges patient and community perspectives.
In case we become too enthusiastic in our drive for inclusivity, Fran Pollner and colleagues 
remind us that not all parties with an interest in the outcomes of medical interventions should 
be part of the decision-making process.[44]  The authors point out that medical device 
representatives often attend surgeries and build relationships with practitioners that can 
influence decisions in a way that is by no means transparent to all patients.  As the dialogue 
of shared decision-making continues, this paper reminds us of the need for an ethical 
discourse on the nature of the market and the potential barriers to progress it presents.
Oliver Thomas discusses the ethics of clinical guidelines and the need for interpretation in 
their application.[45] Thomas considers the problems in finding a balance between an “over-
zealous” conception of guidelines as “unbreakable rules” (which fails to recognise acceptable 
variation in practice) and an abandonment of all adherence to guidelines (which fails to 
recognise their utility in assisting practitioners and patients, all of whom are human beings 
and therefore fallible).  Examining a number of applications with reference to moral theories, 
he argues that the process of writing and implementing guidelines is best understood through 
the lens of Virtue Ethics, which characterises the key role of guidelines as assisting 
practitioners in cultivating the right dispositions to promote sound judgement in context.
Marco Azevedo and Bianca Andrade analyse Darlei Dall’Agnol's account of “respectful care”, 
arguing that “this single attitude... can represent an integrated form of moral practical 
knowledge in healthcare.”[46]  Contrasting his approach to alternative accounts of practical 
reasoning (including Toulmin's casuistry) they link the debate about ethics to broader 
epistemological questions, using the distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that” 
(knowledge as action versus knowledge of propositions) to defend Dall'Agnol's theory of 
“practical cognitivism”.  In this respect, and despite their radically different starting points and 
methods, their paper resonates with the arguments of Hurst and Greenhalgh.[37] In each 
case, by abandoning the notion of knowledge as something “sitting in the mind”, construing 
knowledge instead in dispositional terms – as a form of interaction – traditional distinctions 
between knowledge and decision-making, epistemology and ethics, are broken down.  The 
result is a theoretical framework more directly focused on the needs of practice.[79]
This opening section concludes with two papers raising issues about our understanding of 
health, disease and science.  Peter White discusses the difficulties in identifying the scientific 
causes of chronic fatigue syndrome(CFS), arguing that this may be “because the condition is 
hard to diagnose, difficult to classify, or because of its heterogeneous nature”.[47] White is not 
denying or undermining the experiences of people diagnosed with CFS, but rather is 
questioning the utility of the classification in helping patients and practitioners address those 
difficulties.  He suggests subdividing the condition into likely subgroups as a means of finding 
valid and reliable associations with potential causes.  His concluding comments question our 
underlying philosophical assumptions about the nature of health and disease, including the 
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mental-physical illness dichotomy and the antithesis between organic and functional disease 
states.
Joseph Vere and Barry Gibson undercut the debate about integrating EBM's scientific 
knowledge with other forms of knowledge by arguing that, given both a plausible account of 
EBM and any defensible theory of science, EBM does not, in fact, meet the criteria to qualify 
as science: “any knowledge claims that are made through this approach do not deserve the 
status of science”.[48] They do, however, add an important qualification: “This does not mean 
that evidence based medicine is not important or that the knowledge claims derived from this 
approach should not inform medical decision-making.”  If any defenders of EBM find this 
conclusion objectionable, then it may be appropriate for them to consider their own 
philosophical assumptions about the nature of knowledge and science in particular.[80]  As 
the papers in the next section indicate, patient knowledge is not “scientific” but this does not 
mean it is somehow not “real” knowledge, or of a secondary nature to scientific knowledge, 
and its relevance to understanding proper decision-making in practice is beyond doubt.
Person-centred care and the phenomenology of illness
There is a growing recognition that patients' knowledge of their own experience is at once 
authoritative and indispensable, not only in understanding how to manage their condition, but 
also to get an adequate characterisation of what their condition really is.[13,81-85]  This 
section contains three papers that explore patient experience in depth, explaining the 
importance of recognising the personhood of the patient.  Without an appreciation of the 
context of a person's life, her goals and values, a description of symptoms can of course tell 
us something about the nature of “the problem”, which may serve our purposes in some 
contexts, but which in other contexts can be unhelpful or even misleading.
In the first of two contributions to this edition, Derek Mitchell intertwines accounts of his own 
experience of illness, and the experiences of others which have been recounted to him, with 
discussion of some of the most influential philosophical work in human history, to develop a 
detailed and powerful account of what “the experience of falling ill tells us about the nature of 
our being”.[49]  The account of the relationship between the experience of serious illness and 
our awareness of our own mortality develops and applies insights from philosophers from 
Plato to Heidegger, and also the recent and important work in the phenomenology of illness 
contributed by authors such as Havi Carel.  Heidegger’s account of the experience of anxiety 
and the way that separates us from “the world of involvements” is a crucial starting point for 
the paper which follows, focusing on the journey “from person to patient and back again”.[50]
Noting how easy it is for us to become depersonalised when we become patients, Mitchell 
argues (in line with contributors to previous editions of this journal[86,87]) that we can be 
compliant in this depersonalisation because “in the early stages, particularly of serious illness, 
we do not wish to face the fact that our body is failing”.  Rather than face this, “we separate 
ourselves from our illness”: we do not take ourselves to the doctor for treatment, but rather we 
take our illness.  Mitchell presents a compelling account of the “fragmentation” of the person 
that ensues, how health professionals and systems can push us in the direction of this 
depersonalisation, but also how we can regain the status of personhood while remaining 
users of the healthcare system.  This account has implications for the best ways practitioners 
can develop relationships with patients that recognise their personhood, thus providing care 
that can meaningfully be characterised as “person-centred”.
Karin Engebretsen discusses the continuing problems of people suffering from medically 
unexplained systems, who report “being epistemically marginalized or excluded by health 
professionals”.[51] Engebretson adopts a phenomenological approach to understand “the 
human experience in this context-specific setting”, using extensive evidence from interviews 
with participants who found the experience of encountering general practitioners to be akin to 
“taking part in a battle”, and who reported feeling distrusted by others.  This, the author notes, 
resulted in a “disconnection from their habitual lifeworld, which in turn triggered a shame 
reaction”.  This process had negative implications for recovery, and the paper concludes by 
noting the need to develop solutions to these problems, which address the “norms, values 
and attitudes” involved “as well as issues of power”.
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Shared Decision-Making
The section opens with a series of reports and papers presented to an international 
conference in March 2019.  The conference, at the University of West London(UWL), UK, 
invited papers on ‘Shared Decision-Making, Person-Centred Care & The Values Agenda’ and 
was organised by UWL’s European Institute for Person Centred Health and Social Care, in 
collaboration with the European Society for Person Centered Healthcare and the 
Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, UK.  It 
included contributions from regulators and policy organisations – including the UK’s National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and Italy’s National Research Council – as 
well as practitioners, patient experts and academics, on a broad range of issues confronting 
contemporary health services globally, as they attempt to give meaningful application to the 
core ideas identified in the conference title.
Following the conference address by Sir Andrew Dillon, chair of NICE, Clare Wohlgemuth and 
colleagues from NICE’s Centre for Clinical Guidelines report on the organisation’s efforts to 
establish a “shared understanding of shared decision-making in healthcare”.[52]  In their 
efforts to develop a guideline, NICE colleagues commence with a “scoping” process aimed at 
discovering the key challenges the guideline will need to address, thus “setting the 
parameters for what will be included in the guideline”.  Discussions with a range of 
stakeholders revealed divergent viewpoints, presenting difficulties in finding a common 
definition of Shard Decision-Making (SDM) and raising questions about “measurability, 
opportunities and barriers to implementation as well as feasibility”.  The report provides an 
interesting insight into how guideline developers go about attempting to respond to such 
challenges, in the case of a guideline that is still very much a work in progress.
Fiona Browne and colleagues from the General Osteopathic Council report on an inclusive 
process aimed at promoting person-centred care and SDM in osteopathic practice.[53] 
Discussions involving regulators, patients and practitioners attempted to identify patient and 
practitioner values, testing their application by using methods including case studies and 
considering barriers with reference to real patient narratives.  The efforts to improve 
communication and mutual understanding include improving connections between different 
professionals, in an area where “practitioners work largely in sole-practice and without 
employers or teams”.  Like the work of Wohlgemuth and colleagues, this is very much a work 
in progress, and the authors detail the future stages of the project in their progress report.
A similarly complex and inclusive study is reported by Karin Drivenes and colleagues, 
investigating the relationship between practitioners' attitudes and the delivery of SDM in 
mental healthcare.[54]  Tools to gather information from large numbers of practitioners were 
employed in conjunction with instruments to measure patients’ experiences of SDM.  The 
authors note that positive associations between practitioners’ patient-centred attitudes and 
the successful implementation of SDM are clearly evidenced in the study, and they discuss 
the relevance of these findings for the accomplishment of SDM processes in mental health 
care.
Dilraj Kalsi and colleagues present a summary of “the current and potential use of SDM 
across a wide variety of specialties”, noting the “nuanced and different challenges” to its 
implementation and development in the range of contexts they consider.[55]  Examining SDM 
in primary care, mental health, paediatrics, palliative care and surgery, they note that, despite 
the important differences, there are sufficient similarities to make a meaningful evaluation of 
the progress SDM represents, as well as the resources needed to assure further progress in 
future.  Their paper is followed by a brief commentary by Veryan Richards on the importance 
of communication in clinical practice and its relationship with therapeutic outcomes.[56]  
Drawing on her experience of training health educators, Richards discusses the use of 
language she characterises as ‘person-first’, inclusive, balanced and consistent.  Her paper 
reminds us that communication is not an “add-on” to assist good practice but an integral part 
of it, shaping the nature of relationships and the therapeutic process.
The conference papers are followed by a important discussion of foundational questions 
about the nature of shared decision-making and what it means to be “person-centred”.  Mark 
Tonelli and Mark Sullivan consider a fairly straightforward model, given which SDM is 
primarily focused on treatment choices and represents a transaction between the clinician, 
who supplies scientific knowledge – thus providing the patient with treatment options – and 
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the patient, who contributes values and preferences and chooses on the basis of these.[57] 
This model is perhaps initially appealing because it implies that there is a fairly clear means of 
implementing SDM, but the authors argue convincingly that a more nuanced model is needed 
to give full regard to the autonomy of the patient and the personhood of the practitioner.  To 
protect patients from paternalism, the simple model limits the practitioner to providing factual 
information and invites the patient to choose (based on her/his “subjective values”) between 
the range of “evidence-based options” presented.  But this fact/value distinction “represents a 
false dichotomy” which de-personalises the practitioner and paradoxically also “runs the risk 
of ignoring the very real facts, the experiential reality” of the patient's illness.  The authors 
then outline a more meaningfully “shared” and person-centred approach to decision-making, 
with some similarities to the accounts of co-production referenced in our opening comments.  
They discuss the development of ongoing and respectful partnerships between clinicians and 
patients, that acknowledge the personhood of both parties and encourage an autonomy-
supportive environment that is empathetic and mutually understanding.[57]
The paper by Jonathan Lewis provides a detailed account and critical analysis of standard 
accounts of SDM offered by some of its prominent proponents.[58] Lewis focuses in particular 
on the claim (made in numerous discussions of medical ethics) that SDM respects a patient’s 
“relational autonomy” understood as “a capacity that depends upon, and can only be 
sustained by, interpersonal relationships as well as broader health care and social 
conditions.”   The paper describes two primary approaches to relational autonomy, arguing 
that standard accounts of SDM actually undermine patient autonomy when it is understood in 
this way.  The paper concludes with an important challenge: if SDM is to respect patient 
autonomy, then its proponents need, as a matter of urgency, “to revise the requirements of 
SDM to ensure consistency with the standards of relational autonomy”.
These important critical papers are followed by contributions describing and discussing 
numerous attempts and models to implement SDM and associated ideas in a range of 
practice contexts.  Ann-Catrine Eldh's analysis of “patient participation” notes that 
stakeholders have “diverging understandings and expectations as to what patient participation 
is” and that “procedures for patient participation are not inevitably person-centred”.[59]  Eldh 
discusses a tool designed to facilitate greater mutual understanding of patient participation, 
but notes that “further studies are needed to operationalize patient preferences in clinical 
practice, in order to facilitate patient participation in healthcare”.  Chirk Jenn Ng and 
colleagues propose a dual-layered model of shared decision-making that helps to establish 
priorities for patients with complex multimorbities.[60]  In each layer of the process, patients 
and primary care providers mutually decide on the focus of a clinical encounter and the ideal 
treatment.  The model offers a clear and focused strategy when clinical resources are limited 
and consultations are short.
Min-Chun Chung and colleagues apply the Knowledge-Attitude-Behaviour model to probe 
perceptions of SDM in health care professionals working in various hospitals in southern 
Taiwan.[61]  Their study revealed positive attitudes to SDM and predictable barriers to its 
implementation, identified as lack of time and knowledge and the difficulty of developing 
patient decision-aids: guides to shared decision making in specific contexts that can help 
clinicians work through a decision with their patients.  The authors conclude that continuous 
emphasis on education regarding SDM can contribute to promoting a positive attitude to its 
acceptance and can influence the behaviour of practitioners.  Farah Asa'ad evaluates the 
implementation of SDM in dentistry and the roles of patient decision-making aids(PDAs),  
concluding that “PDAs in various dental fields need to be further developed, in order to ensure 
a satisfactory integration of patients in the SDM process”.[62]  Arguing that dentistry is 
“behind” other areas of clinical practice in these respects, the author calls for educational 
interventions to help practising dentists and faculty responsible for educating dental students, 
to meet the precepts of SDM.
The paper is followed by a contribution from Georgette Eaton on the problem of “learning 
values”.[63]  The author notes that “professional values” are frequently identified as a 
“fundamental element” of SDM and that the British National Health Service has adopted a 
series of values that are seen as “foundational”.  Focusing specifically on the paramedic 
profession, Eaton notes there is very little research on how these values are actually learned 
and interpreted in practice.  Her study involved paramedic students and educators submitting 
diary entries and taking part in focus groups, and highlighted the need for professional values 
Page 8 of 15Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
For peer review only
to be explored explicitly within the undergraduate curriculum, to enable paramedic students to 
understand and develop their values from an early stage.
Christopher Lamb and colleagues produced a path model of how physician decision-making 
style is associated with patient decision-making around treatment choice for primary 
immunodeficiency(PID), which is rare but expensive to treat.[64] The model was developed 
by applying structural equation analysis to cross-sectional findings from 330 web-based 
surveys completed by United States physicians treating over half the country’s PID patients 
requiring immune globulin. These surveys had been completed by United States physicians 
treating over half the country’s PID patients requiring treatment with immune globulin. The 
study compared the physicians with an affinity for using a slow, rational, analytical style of 
decision making around life-long treatment choices for PID, and those with a heuristic style 
that is fast and intuitive.  A rational style was positively associated, both directly and mediated 
by a patient-centred approach, with patient participation with protocols.  In contrast, a 
heuristic style was associated with increased participation with treatment tools.
Abhimanyu Ahuja highlights how heuristic biases can undermine the clinical encounter.[65] 
While heuristics are valuable shortcuts in clinical decision-making, they risk biasing 
physicians through stereotyping.  Ahuja recommends a “deliberative model” of the physician-
patient relationship that emphasizes communication and allows physicians to reflect more 
thoroughly on their biases.  The acknowledgement and disclosure of such personal beliefs 
and biases on the part of practitioners is, according to Keith Begley and colleagues, a 
necessary condition of meaningful SDM.[66]  The authors characterise such biases as 
“epistemic defeaters” to be overcome through a process of open dialogue.  They share the 
results of a review of the interaction between SDM practices in maternity care and the 
frequency of and reasons behind recommendations for caesarean surgeries, drawing a link 
between attitudes toward women’s knowledge and how important SDM was to practitioners.
The kernel of the authors’ argument is that physicians owe pregnant and birthing women a 
duty of care that is specifically epistemic: a duty to acknowledge the special knowledge of 
these women, which is no less important than the physician’s own knowledge in informing 
decision-making during maternity care.  Physicians are also persons, who bring to the 
encounter values and external concerns that may influence their decision-making – hence the 
need to be transparent about their own “defeaters”.  In doing so, they act as equals, people 
who also have lives outside of the healthcare context, and legitimate concerns beyond the 
health of their patient.  By giving the patient full knowledge in respect to their 
recommendations (not just the recommendation itself, but the reasons why they make it) 
practitioners move beyond “informed consent”, and this transparency lays the groundwork for 
truly shared decision making, through which those defeaters might be overcome.
Some patients are reluctant to assert their care preferences to clinicians, especially in the 
face of critical illness.  Karina Olling and colleagues report from Denmark their “before and 
after” study of the effect of a patient decision aid on SDM in this context.[67] Applying a 
validated tool, the OPTION scale, experienced oncology nurses independently observed 
decision support to facilitate patient-centred communication in real life.  Regardless of 
clinicians’ training in SDM, the decision aid produced a statistically significant overall increase 
in patients sharing preference-sensitive decisions about adjuvant therapy after breast cancer 
surgery, and especially in diagnostic work-up because of a small suspicion of lung cancer.
Eva Sather and colleagues employed a qualitative research design with a descriptive 
approach to reveal important factors in care pathways for former mental-health patients, in 
their transition between district psychiatric hospital centres and community mental health 
services in Norway.[68] They found that the importance of shared information between all 
parties was key to the provision of SDM in a way that actually helps patients seeking to 
develop the knowledge, skills and confidence to manage their own health.
In the paper by Marisa Sklar and colleagues,[69] we see a patient-centred approach being 
taken up at the institutional level, by Patient Centred Medical Homes(PCMH) – centres where 
a number of medical services can be found together within the same building, so that patients 
experience a whole body access to care, and medical services regularly interact and operate 
under a centralized administration.  They studied the experiences of physicians and nurses 
who worked in this context and found that the more survey respondents experienced their 
own workplace as a site of shared responsibilities and collegial networks, the more they felt 
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the principles of the PCMH were truly put into place.  The study indicated significant variability 
in PCMH characteristics across the United States and Canada.  Sources of friction were 
perceptions that the workload of being patient-centered was not equally shared, or that 
interactions between other practitioners in their network were less than smooth.
Cristian Baicus and colleagues report their multi-centre, cross-sectional study of 
characteristics of SDM by outpatients around treatment for an autoimmune disease or atrial 
fibrillation in Romania.[70]  Their study indicates that protecting the anonymity of patients 
increases the discriminatory power of their evaluation of the SMD process and should be part 
of the methodology of future evaluations of SDM, even at the cost of a reduced response rate.  
When completing the Romanian version of the 9-item SMD questionnaire validated in this 
study, the patients with an autoimmune disease rated the SMD process as lower when the 
rating was anonymously online rather than in the hospital.  In contrast, it was low in both 
settings among those with lower education and either an autoimmune disease or atrial 
fibrillation.
Rahbel Rahman and colleagues report perceptions of patient-centered care among providers 
and patients in the orthopedic department of a tertiary care hospital in Karachi, Pakistan.[71] 
Their study examined the perspectives of 18 healthcare providers (nurses, consultant doctors, 
residents, radiologists, physiotherapists) and 18 patients regarding best practices for person-
centred care and discovered significant agreements regarding the role of family in patient 
decisions, but some discrepancies regarding issues including the continuity of care offered 
post-discharge.  The authors call for recurrent training to improve teamwork among providers, 
in particular “questioning the implicit agreement of patients who may be vulnerable to 
decision-making of authoritarian figures in their family”.  They also suggest including peer 
support workers or community health workers to offer aftercare support to patients in their 
home.
As cervical cancer screening is transitioning to include human papillomavirus (HPV) options, 
Canadian authors Brianne Wood and colleagues have responded to the need for a tool to 
elicit the preferences of women from among the available modalities for cervical cancer 
screening.[72]  The Ottawa Decision Support Framework and International Patient Decision 
Aids Standards (IPDAS) quality criteria guided the design and feasibility testing of an online 
survey tool in a convenience sample of 25 highly educated women eligible for cervical 
screening. The test findings provided preliminary evidence that the tool can feasibly elicit 
informed, values-based preferences in a balanced manner among the available modalities.  A 
refined tool could ultimately be used for research to inform screening guidelines or shared 
decision-making during clinical encounters.
Arguably some areas of practice provide far more serious challenges to implementing person-
centred care and SDM than others. Camille Paynter and colleagues state that the methods of 
SDM include “eliciting and acknowledging patients’ preferences for participation, patient 
choices regarding how decision-making processes will proceed, and respect and adherence 
of patient choices by their clinicians”.[73]  They note that decision-making becomes far more 
complex when there are “no curative treatment options” combined with “a high prevalence of 
communication difficulties and a lesser prevalence of cognitive difficulties within a context of a 
rapidly progressive condition”, as seen in motor neurone disease.(MND)  Their extensive 
review of the literature regarding decision-making within the MND population  reveals that, 
while “most studies acknowledge that deficits in communication or cognition impact the 
decision-making process”, current insights into the impact of communication and/or cognitive 
impairments on healthcare decision-making are extremely limited.  Until this deficit is 
addressed, people with MND and their carers will not be adequately supported.
End-of-life decisions present another area where the meaningful application of person-
centred approaches and SDM seems at once eminently important and particularly difficult to 
implement.  Marion Douplat and colleagues conducted a prospective multi-centre study in 
three emergency departments of university hospitals in France, to describe the management 
of the decision-making process of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments.[74] 
The results made it clear that there is still very little anticipation in end-of-life decisions, and 
the authors conclude that “discussion with patients concerning their end-of-life wishes as well 
as the writing of advance directives, especially for patients with chronic diseases, must be 
encouraged early”.
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Inés Morán-Sánchez and colleagues focus on SDM in mental health and illness.[75]  Their 
starting point is the observation that little is known about the extent to which people with 
severe mental illness actually want to be involved in the decision-making process.  Their 
extensive study of outpatients with a range of mental disorders concluded that psychiatric 
patients “more frequently preferred a passive role in the decision-making process” and that 
interventions to promote SDM need to be carefully tailored to the values and needs of each 
patient, “because not everyone wants to participate to the same degree”.  While agreeing that 
“part of the SDM process entails allowing patients to not participate in SDM if that is their 
preference,” and that “pressuring patients to engage in SDM undermines the goals of this 
model”, Wilson Trusty and colleagues also site research supporting SDM for mental and 
behavioural health concerns, providing recommendations for increasing shared decision-
making when working with patients.[76]  The need to be person-centred, to tailor the 
approach to the specific needs and values of each patient, emerges from each article as an 
overriding concern if SDM is to be meaningful and actually helpful to clinicians and patients.
The section concludes with a paper by Kerstin Knight that focuses on an area where 
conceptual and practical problems are inseparable: the identity problem of advance care 
planning(ACP).[77]  ACP is viewed as a form of shared decision-making between carers and 
patients who anticipate losing decision-making capacity, but such decisions raise serious and 
unresolved philosophical questions regarding the identity status of the mentally incapacitated 
person, and how to evaluate that person's rights and interests.  Knight argues that a narrative 
account of identity best addresses the identity problem.  Unfortunately, such an account 
seems incompatible with our current medico-legal framework for attributing decision making 
capacity.  Thus, the law “espouses conflicting views as to who can be an appropriate decision 
making authority for patient care”.  Bodies governing medical care need to address these 
underlying questions as a matter of urgency, if they are to develop coherent policies and 
practices regarding SDM and person-centred care.
Book reviews
The edition includes three book reviews, including two offering different but complementary 
perspectives on the text: Evaluating Evidence of Mechanisms in Medicine: Principles and 
Procedures, by Veli-Pekka Parkkinen and colleagues.  Lise Marie Andersen and Jesper 
Nørgaard Kjær regard this contribution as timely and valuable, given the on-going debate 
about evidence-based medicine and its relationship with mechanistic explanation.[88]  While 
offering criticisms and suggestions for broadening the text's philosophical base, Adam La 
Caze agrees that the text addresses an important gap in the literature.[89]  
Mary Walker reviews Thomas Schramme’s Just Enough Health: Theories of Health 
Justice.[90] She recommends the text as a comprehensive introduction to the topic of health 
justice, and notes that the chapters on specific topics or the book as a whole would be an 
excellent resource for teaching introductory lessons or courses on this topic.
Concluding comments: SDM and person-centred practice
SDM and person-centred care offer exciting possibilities, but the process of giving these core 
ideas meaning and application is on-going and not without risk.  Simplistic models, such as 
the one identified and effectively criticised by Tonelli and Sullivan,[57] are likely to seem more 
straightforward and appealing than the more nuanced models needed to deliver the progress 
many contributors to this volume clearly seek.  The model of SDM as a transaction between 
practitioners as the providers of knowledge and the patient as a consumer of care is of course 
instantly intelligible to policy-makers and managers, resonating with the dominant market 
ideology of our era. [91]  The dangers of regarding medical consumerism as the natural 
alternative to medical paternalism are also well recognised – see, for instance, Aquino's 
important work on “big-eye surgery”[92] which suggests that we do not succeed in treating 
patients as persons simply by asking them “of the options available, what do you want?”, 
ignoring the broader cultural and economic context constraining their responses.  As Pollner 
and colleagues note,[44] commercial interests will impact on the decision-making process in 
ways that do not always directly consider the broader interests and values of patients or 
indeed the ethics and values of practitioners.  As Knight observes,[77] SDM is typically 
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understood as a process involving different kinds of agents who share the requirement to 
have “sufficient capacity for the decision in question”.  This understanding raises numerous 
conceptual and practical questions about how to enact this process when dealing with the 
many human beings whose decision-making capacity does not conform to standard models of 
“full capacity”.
None of these difficulties should deter us from seeking the more nuanced, more challenging 
(both intellectually and practically) account of person-centred care and SDM defended by 
such authors as Tonelli and Sullivan,[57] and strongly suggested in the contributions of 
authors such as Hurst and Greenhalgh,[37] Azevedo and Andrade[46] and others.  The 
important work of contributors to this edition gives us reason to feel assured that the serious 
work still needed to translate these important ideas into practice can indeed be done.
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